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Introduction
Over the past two years, a political  revolution  has swept through eastern Europe.  One
country after another has taken advantage  of the changes in the Soviet Union to sweep away
communist regimes, to  introduce democracy and  civil  liberties, and  to  restructure their
economies into market economies.  While political changes have been rapid, the economic
restructuring  promises to be a long and painful procuss.  The German unification  provides an
opportunity to  learn  a  few lessons about the  immensity of  this  task in  the  best  of  all
circumstances:  the take-over  by a "big brother" who  is ready to lend  a hand in the reennstruction
task, and willing to foot most of the bill.
There are, of course, important  differences  between the situation of east Germany  and
its former Comecon  partners. They mostly relate to the fact that east Germany' has become  an
integrae  part of a larger, and much richer, country.  In east Germany, external factor mobility
(both  labor and capital) plays an important  role.  In eastern Europe, there will be little external
labor mobility, and even capital flows will only play a  secondary role.  The adjustment
mechanism  will be primarily through an exchange rate adjustment, to generate exports to pay
for imported investment  goods. Most  of the investment  needed  to adapt the outdated  human  and
physical  capital stock  will have to be generated  by domestic  saving. East Germans, by contrast,
are experiencing  an immediate  increase in living standards  and consumption,  financed  by large
fiscal transfers from west Germany.
Despite these obvious differences, there remain important common factors.  East
Germany shares with other eastern European economies a common legacy of socialism and
The  term east Germany  is used to denote  the area  of the  former  German  Democratic  Republic  (GDR)  after  the unification  (October
3, 1990). For  earlier  dates, the terms 'GDR' and 'East Gernany' are used..2-
central planning that has led to similarly low productivity, similar poor integration into the world
economy, similar technological backwardness, and a consequent need to restructure the economy
from  the basement to the roof.  Eastern European countries also share the common aspiration
to become full members of the European Community.  Since the macro-economic adjustments
are different, transferrable lessons are mostly in the micro-economics of structural change in east
Germany.  They relate both  to the past--a more realistic assessment of  the backwardness  of
socialist economies--and the future, for example, the extent of restructuring required in industry,
or lessons about the privatization process.
A.  The Legacy of the  Past
If there  ever was a  "model" socialist economy,  it had  to be the German Democratic
Republic.  It boasted the highest living standards among socialist countries and had implemented
Stalin's  model of "democratic centralism"  (and its application to economic organization) most
rigorously.  The private  sector accounted for only 4% of economic activity in  1989.  Like in
Czechoslovakia,  the government  maintained tight control over  enterprises,  and avoided large
macro-economic imbalances or excessive external borrowing that plagued Poland,  Yugoslavia
or Hungary.
The main shortcomings X  i  GDR economy were the common,  systemic weaknesses
of  command  economies:  ct.  ;alization  and  bureaucratization,  excessive  information
requirements, poor incentives and lack of individual initiative 2. Together,  they resulted in slow
innovation and productivity growth.  In order to manage the information overload of a command
economy,  autarky  was  pursued  at  all  levels:  internationally,  within  sectoral  and  regional
bureaucracies,  and  even  at  the enterprise  level.  Enterprises  tended  to  be  large  and  self-
contained, producing a large share of parts and components in-house, at sub-optimal scale and
often with inadequate, artisanal methods.  Outdated production techniques at the plant level were
2  See, e.g. Hayek (1935),  Granick  (1975),  or Hewett  (1988)  for theoretical  and  empirical  discussions  of the shortcomings  of  ocialist
economies.-3  -
combined with sectoral monopolies for final products, eliminating competition and stifling
innovation  and efficiency. Large units were created where there were no economies  of scale,
for example, in agriculture,  but opportunitics  to reap economies  of scale, for example, through
specialization  and buying-iii of components  in much of manufacturing  were largely missed.
Enterprises  produced  a very large range of products, as external  trade was tightly  circumscribed.
The large range of social services provided directly by enterprises to their workers further
reduced efficiency, and turned enterprises into social and political, rather than economic,
organizations.
Productivity and Income Levels
Western analysts  have,  in  the  past,  widely  overestimated the  productivity and
competitiveness  of socialist  economies. 3 Table 1 reproduces some of the best known western
estimates of income levels in eastern Europe. 4 These estimates put East German per capita
income at  50-70% of  US  levels,  and  43-86% of  West  German levels,  depending on
methodology, with purchasing power and physical indicator methods  at the upper end of the
range.  In all estimates,  the GDR is on top, followed  by Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, the USSR,
Poland and then the poorer south-eastern  European  countries.
Comparing  western and eastem economic  statistics  was difficult  for a number of reasons:  (a) socialist  countries  used different
methodologies  for national  income  statistics; (1) administratively  set prices  and absence  of competition  led  to different  measures  of
inflation  and real growth; (c) limited  involvement  in foreign  trade led  to a very different  economic  structure; and (d) in some  cases,
unfavorable  statistics  were withheld  and sometimes  falsified. Western  analysts  have  employed  a number  of techriques in trying to
overcome  these difficulties  and to estimate  comparable  national  income indicators  for socialist  economies. The simplest  approach
involved  taking eastern European  national  income  data (based  on the material  product  system  - MPS)  and to adjust  them to western
definitions  (GDP or GNP, according  to the UN's system  of national  accounts  - SNA), by adding  in 'non-material asrvices  and
depreciation  to yield GDP in domestic  currency. In the absence  of market-determined  eXchange  rates, an eatimate  had, however,  to
be made  to convert  GDP to a common  denominator.  Three  approaches  have  been used: (a) using  a purchasing  power parity (PPP)
exchange  rate, derived  from price comparisons;  (c) adjusting  official  exchange  rates or purchasing  power parities  to reflect  market
exchange  rates; and (c) avoiding  official national  accounts  data altogether,  by estimating  comparable  income levels directly  from
detailed  physical  output  data.
4  Alton, PlanEcon  and SummersMHeston  used a purchasing  power parity (PPP) exchange  rate (derived  from price comparisons)  to
convert  domestic  currency  into dollars,  Marer adjusted  the PPP exchange  rate to reflect  income-related  deviations  between  market
exchange  rates  and purchasingpower  parities,  observed  among  market  economiesat  different  levels  of income. The 1982  World  Bank
Atlas estimate  used the non-commercial  official exchange  rate.  In view of the uncertainties  involved  in all available  conversion
methods.  Fink/Havlik  used regression  techniques  to estimate  equivalent  dollar incomes, based on a large number of physical
indicators (e.g., steel consumption,  hospital  beds, etc.).  An overview of past estimates of castcrn European  per capita income
estimates  is given in Lancieri  (1991).-4  -
Table 1:  Alternative Western Estimates of Eastern European Per Capita GNP in 1980
(in percent  of US per capita GDP)
Exchange Rate Adjusted  Purchasing Power Panty  Phys  ladicators
World Bank  Summers-  Fink-
Marer  Atlas (1982)  Alton  PlanEcon  Heston  Havlik
East  Germany  52  63  63  63  69  70
Czechoslovakia  42  51  55  55  61  66
Hungary  39  37  47  47  48  58
Poland  33  34  43  43  44  52
West Germany  120  120  - 73  83  81
USA  100  100  100  100  100  100
East Germtny/West  Germsny (%)  (43)  (53)  - (86)  (83)  (86)
Source: Lancieri (1991)
Binary purchasing power comparisons between East and West Germany,5 have yielded
lower estimates for East Germany than those in Table 1, pegging purchasing power GDP in East
Germany  at  58%  of  West  German  levels  in  1983.  The  implied  purchasing  powe~r  parity
exchange rate was estimated at around  1:1 (GDR Mark/DM).  East German labor productivity
averaged  49%  of  West  German  levels,  ranging  from  41%  in  agriculture  to  51%  in
manufacturing and 57% in construction.  Sub-sectoral estimates in manufacturing were lowest
for  process  industries (cement--41%,  food and beverages--43%)  and  highest for  engineering
goods (machinery--56%).
In retrospect,  all these comparisons failed to take account of the large--and increasing--
difference  in  product  quality  between  market  and  planned  economies.  Despite  these
shortcomings,  the comparisons  within each  set of  countries  (planned/market)  are reasonably
reliable.  Eastern European economies had similar management systems, resulting in similarly
investment  and  production  patterns,  and  the  same  is  true  for  most  industrialized  market
economies.  However,  comparisons  across  different  systems are  hazardous.  The  planned
'The  most comprehensive source for comparisons between the GDR and FRO is Deutscher Bundestag (1987).economies have pursued very different policies, resulting in different, by western standards
highly distorted, production  and consumption  patterns.
The impact of quality differentials  and economically  irrational trade patterns became
apparent when the veil on the secrets  of East German trade statistics  was lifted in 1990. Until
then, trade statistics were expressed in "valuta mark" (VM), whose value was a mystery. 6 It
was revealed that the domestic  currency  costs of convertible  currency  exports were 4.40 M/DM
in  1989 rather than 1:1 or  1.6:1 implied in trade statistics. 7 Domestic resource costs' of
convertible  currency  exports had increased  sharply during the 1980's (from 2.40 M/DM in 1980
to 2.90 in 1985, and 4.40 in 1989),  documenting  a rapid loss in external  competitiveness. The
"equilibrium"  market exchange rate--reflecting  competitiveness  in the tradeable goods sector--
was more than three-quarters  below purchasing  power parity.  East Germany  fairly high living
standards  in terms of old fashioned  "material" goods (eggs, bricks, or tram tickets), but living
standards  were low in terms of goods and services  that had elsewhere  experienced  large quality
changes (cars, consumer  electronics, prepared foods, etc.).  The "Trabant", the symbol of the
GDR's predicament,  is a cas2 in point: it is at best equivalent  to a 1950s  vintage West German
car.
Growth and Investment
Official statistics  continued  to paint a rosy picture of growth and economic  development
in the GDR--right  up to the collapse  of the regime. According  to official  statistics, East German
per capita income had gained  66% on West Germany  over the past three decades, and continued
lbe  fiction of I VM  =  I DM was maintained  in economic ;elations  with West Germany. The official value in terms of a transfer
rouble was 4.67 VM/TR, and the implicit cross rate with the DM (based again on the official, but equally arbitrary,  dollar/rouble
exchange rate of 0.65 TR/S) was 1.62 VM/DM in 1988.
7  The underlying market-clearing  exchange rate was actually even more unfavorable, since imports were tightly controlled  thr".!h
administrative  restrictions,  and an easing of these restrictions  would have required  a further  exchange rate adjustment.
Due to domestic price distortions,  exports valued  at domestic  prices are not stric-Jy  domestic resource  costs.  However, for sufficiently
broad categories of goods, subsidies  and levies cancel out.  For all convertible currency  exports, costs at (distorted) domestic pricea
are approximately  equal  to domestic resource costs (=economic  costs in domestic currency).-6  -
to  grow  at  4%  p.a.  (double West  German  rates)  throughout  the  1980's.  The  reality  was
different.  Western estimates--based on micro-economic data--put JDP  growth at slightly less
than  2%  p.a.  for  the  1980s.  somewhat  higher  than  the  neighboring  socialist  "reform"
economies.9 But  even  this  is  an  overestimate.  In  reality,  productivity  and  external
competitiveness  have  fallen  further  behind,  as  structural  change  (such  as  a  reduction  in
agricultural or textile industry employment) remained very limited.
Like other eastern European countries, the GDR tried to maintain flagging growth in the
1.970s  through increased external borrowing.  Net external debt increased from negligible levels
in  1970 to about US $  11 billion in  1980 and was used primarily  to maintain high  levels of
industrial  investment.  The borrowing  strategy proved unsustainable:  external debt increased
to three times convertible currency exports by 1979.  With the onset of the second oil crisis,  the
borrowing  strategy was reversed: exports were increased at all costs to reduce the outstand ng
debt.  One avenue was fuel substitution: wherever possible, heavily polluting  solid fuels were
substituted for imported Soviet oil, and the oil surplus was exported to the West.
Since income levels in the two halves of Germany were roughly the same before 1945,
one can derive the growth rate, according to western definitions, by comparing present and past
income levels.  Table 2 gives two measures: first, using GNP estimates for 1989, resulting from
the Mark/DM conversion at 1:1 (about 52% of west German levels)." 0 Under this assumption,
per  capita GNP growth for the GDR was  1.9% p.a.,  roughly one-half West Germany's  rate.
An alternative estimate can be derived by taking the GNP for  1989, and applying the implicit
Mark/DM  exchange rates for GDR exports in  1990 (4.40 M/DM).11 This  yields a far lower
income level (15% of West Germany's),  and an implicit per capita growth rate of minus 1.9%
9  Alton (1989),  Heston (1989).
'  Derived from national  accounts  calculation for cast Germany  by the  German  Statistical  Office for 1990, and growth rates  for 1989190,
estimated  by one of the leading Geman economic research institutes  (DIW).  Per capita GNP in cast Germany  in 1990 wa  42% of
west German levels.  In view of the sharp decline in GNF a  1990 (-16%), the implicit value for  1989 b  52%.
This exchange rate would have  been unsustainable if the GDR economy had been opened to  foreign competition  (without masive
capkal inflows), as this rate  reflects tight import restrictions.  Moreover, the official GNP figures for  1989, releasad for the firs  time
in  1990, has been revised downward by 20%.7 -
p.a. for the past four decades. The higher estimate is based on purchasing power parities (and
would not be sustainable without massive fiscal transfers), while the lower estimate reflects
international competitiveness  in tradeable goods, and is comparable to the situation of other
eastern European countries. The achievements  of forty years of socialism  are, in comparable
western definitions, at best sluggish growth and perhaps even sustained regression, due to
economic  and technological  isolation.
Table 2:  Germany: Official anid  Rc-Estimated  Growth  Rates, 1950-1989
GN'P  GNP  per Capita
Federal Republic of Gennany  4.2  3.6
German Democratic  Republic
- Official  Statistics  (NMP)  5.6  5.9
- basedon 1989GNP,  at 1:  lMark/DM  1.6  1.9
- based on 1989  GNP, at 4.40 Mark/DM  -2.2  -1.9
Source:  FRG and GDR Statistical  Yearbooks,  DIW
Foreign Trade
Like in other socialist countries, the extelnal trade of East Germany was carried out
exclusively through specialized foreign trade corporations that had a monopoly within their
sector or product range and were the principal contact point for foreign buyers and sellers.
Trade with CMEA member  countries  was carried out on the basis of bilateral trade agreements.
While raw material  prices were based on five year averages  of world market prices, prices for
industrial goods were  essentially negotiated, since international prices  for  these  (mostly
uncompetitive)  goods were hard to establish. Use of unrealistic  transfer rouble/dollar  exchange
rates' 2 made the share of CMEA trade appear far larger than its actual significance.  At
realistic rouble exchange rates, reflecting domestic resource costs, less than one-half of East
12  The official  cross rate was originally  0.65 TR/S.  In 1989,  TR/S cross rates used in national  trade  atistics  ranged  fiom 0.65 in
Bulgaria,  to 1.74  in the GDR, 2.09 in Hungary  and 2.96 in Poland.  (Economic  Bulletin  for Europe  42/1990,  Box 2.1).- 8 -
German trade was with CMEA members, and the same is true for most other Eastern European
economies (Table 3).  '
Table J:  Exports of East Germany and Eastern Europe,  1989
----  Exports  per  capita  (S)  non-CMEA
To:  CMEAq/  non-CMEA  EEC  % of total
GDR  990  380  610  340  62
Czechoslovakia  800  370  430  160  53
Hungary  930  370  560  230  60
Poland  400  180  220  110  56
a/  At uniform transfer rouble/dollar  cross rate of 2.0  TR/S, except for the Soviet Union, where oil and gas exponts to  CMEA countries  are
priced at world rnarket prices, and all other CMEA expots  at 2.0 TR/$.
Source: IMF: Direction of Trade Statistics; CMEA trade:  Economic Bulletin for Europe 42/90; EEC Trade: Moebius and Schumacher (1991)
Far more important is the low export intensity, with per capita exports of around $990
for the GDR--less than Portugal ($1,200), and one-fifths of West German levels ($5,500).
Despite  its orthodox  command  economy,  total and convertible  currency  exports of the GDR  were
higher than  elsewhere  in eastern  Europe  (on a per capita  basis), reflecting  the inherited  industrial
know-how  and the special relationship  with West Germany. Intra-German  trade was treated in
West Germany  as domestic  trade, with no tariff or other barriers applying  to imports from East
Germany.  Not surprisingly, two-thirds  of East German exports to the European Community
were to West Germany (although  some may have been re-exported  to the rest of the EC, after
entering duty free via West Germany).  Despite this favorable treatment, the share of East
Germany  in West Germany's imports declined  from 1.6% in 1980 to 1.4% in 1989.
t3  Table 3 uses per capita exports and common TR/S cross  dtes and takes trade data from western trade partner sources where possible.
In view of the unreliable national accounts data, and different progres. in exchange rate adjustment toward market fundamentals, more
familiar export/GDP ratios could be highly unreliable, and misleading.The Past  Legacy: Summary
Within  the group  of  CMEA countries,  the GDR  maintained  its  position as  the most
developed  and  industrialized  socialist economy.  Compared  to  the  "refo-n"  economies,  the
preservation  of orthodox  Stalinist economic policies  was not  a major disadvantage.  On two
essential counts,  growth and hard currency exports,  the GDR continued to perform better than
Hungary,  Poland  or  Yugoslavia.  Compared  to West Germany  and  other  European  market
economies,  the conclusion is very  different: as elsewhe:e  in eastern Europe,  ihe shortcomings
of command economies led to inadequate incentives, irefficient organizational patterns, isolation
from world markets and a divorce from the international division of labor and the diffusion of
technological  progress.  T'e  production  of  increasingly  outdated  and  unwanted  products
increased  at a  moderate rate,  but in terms of  comparable measures of economic growth and
welfare, the GDR experienced four decades of virtual stagnation.  However, as in other eastern
European  countries,  living  standards  and  productive  potential  are  significantly  higher  than
suggested by per capita incomes at market clearing exchange rates, which reflect the distortions
of the past,  and  the high demand for imported investment goods after the sudden opening of
these economies.
B.  Unification:  The Evolving Policy Framework
Chancellor Kohl's  proposal  for  a currency  union,  made in early  February  1990,  was
essentially a  political  decision.  Until then,  virtually  all proposals  made by  the  economics
profession  envisaged a gradual transition of the GDR towards a market economy, including a
step-by-step move towards convertibility,  supported by a flexible exchange rate policy."
4 The
offer  for monetary union was made conditional on the GDR "creating simultaneously the legal
prerequisites  for introducing a social market economy".
1  The Council  of Economic  Advisors  of the  Federal  Republic  did not  even mention  the possibility  of a monetary  union in its advisory
report on economic  reform options  for the GDR  just two weeks before  the proposal  was made.  However,  a few prominent  Wcst
German  economists  and politicians  of both colors  had advocated  a rapid monetary  union,  and the advisory  council  of the Ministry
of Economics  had envisaged  such an option in December  as part of an alternative  scenario that would lead to rapid political
unification.- 10  -
Monetary and Economic Union
The principal features of the "monetary,  economic  and social union," negotiated  in May 1990
included:
*  Conversion of  all current payments at an exchange rate of  .1  - (M/DM),  roughly
maintaining  past purchasing power.
*  Conversion of all outstanding  monetary claims and liabilities  at 2:1, except for a per
capita quota of savings, converted at 1:1.
*  Adoption, by the GDR, of a market economy, based on private property.
a  Introduction of a common  legal and regulatory environment,  based on the laws of the
Federal Republic.
D  Introduction of  the  main features of  West German social policies, including free
collective  bargaining, comprehensive  retirement, medical and unemployment  insurance,
and worker participation  in company  organs.
The question of the appropriate conversion  from Marks to DM created the most heated
controversy in the discussions leading to the monetary union.  In recent years, the implicit
exchange rate for convertible  currency exports had deteriorated to 4.4 M/DM (see above) and
free market rates (outside the GDR) had been around 12:1.  A majority of economists  and
commentators in West Germany (including the Bundesbank) argued for a  2:1 rate as the
maximum feasible, while public opinion in East Germany was strongly in favor of a  1:1
conversion  (implying  pre-tax wages  of about  one-third  West German  levels). The arguments  for
a  1:1 conversion were based on past purchasing power and productivity comparisons (see
above). They also reflected  political  and social  concerns. It was difficult  to "sell" re-unification- lI  l 
to GDR citizens, if that involved  perceived  large cuts in living standards,  while much better-off
west Germans would not have to share much of their income and wealth.
This  still left the question of  what to do  with outstanding assets and liabilities of
enterprises and households. Imported  equipment  had generally  been sold to enterprises at the
implicit  exchange  rate (recently  4.40 M/DM)  and was financed  by channeling  household  savings
and deposits through the state bank to enterprises.  A 1:1 conversion would have burdened
enterprises with debt up to four times the actual value of imported  plant and equipment. The
approach finally adopted was currency conversion  cum monetary reform, not unlike the 1948
currency reform in West Germany:  wages, pensions, stipends, rentals and other current
payments were converted at  1:1;  all past claims were converted at 2:1."5  The resulting
conversion was 1:1 for current payments, and an average of around 1.8:1 for the consolidated
balance sheet of the banking system. From a monetary  perspective,  the conversion  was not too
different from the Bundesbank  proposal  of 2:1 that also included  an (unspecified)  adjustment  of
wages to compensate for losses in purchasing power arising from price adjustments.  The
currency reform had dramatic consequences  for the balance sheets of financial  institutions: a
substantial  part of their liabilities  was converted at 1:1, while almost all assets were converted
at 2:1, leaving large negative  net worth.  An "equalization  fund" was set up to cover valuation
losses arising from the currency conversion, plus any shortfalls  to meet West German capital
adequacy  rules for banks. These assets are interest bearing  and will be amortized  over a period
of 40 years.
Privatization  issues  were, together  with the "appropriate"  exchange  rate, among  the most
contested  issues in the discussions  on economic  union.  There was little disagreement  about the
switch  to a market  economy,  based  on private  ownership  and the legal and regulatory  framework
of the FRG.  There was, however, disagreement  on the scope and means of privatization,  and
the extent of  reprivatization (restitution) to  former owners.  As discussed further below,
I  Except for a per capita quota for savings accounts, converted at 1:1 up to a maximum of M 4,000 per adult (equivalent to about four
months pre-union wages), M 2,000 for children, and M 6,000 for retired persons.  'Me average conversion rate for savings accounts
was about 1.4:1.- 12 -
misperceptions  in East Germany  about the value of "productive"  assets of the GDR  explain most
of these differences. The monetary  union treaty left many details to be resolved later.  In the
months  before the economic  union, a number of legal changes had already been introduced to
permit private sector activities, to reprivatize  small and medium  enterprises  nationalized  in 1972
and to convert state enterprises into independent  entities, vested into a state property fund, the
Treuhandanstalt. The law on privatization  and reorganization  of state property, enacted at the
same time as the monetary  union treaty, provided for the privatization  of all state enterprises  and
most other state property.
A number of transitional  measures were agreed in the treaty to assist enterprises to
adjust. These included: temporary  quantitative  restrictions  on imports of agricultural  products;
temporary  import duties on certain  consumer  durables;  investment  subsidies  of 12%  for the first
year and 8% for the second  year of the economic  union; and a reduction  of the value-added  tax
in the Federal Republic  for GDR imports.  In the event, the temporary  import restrictions  and
import duties proved unenforceable,  once border controls were eliminated,  and were abolished
in the first weeks of the economic  union.
Financing. The adoption  of the West German  tax system had the effect of dramatically
reducing government  revenues, previously  based on high levies on enterprises. The resulting
deficit was projected  to reach about  DM 52 billion (20% of GNP) for the first full year after the
economic  union. Two-thirds  of the projected  deficit were to be financed  by budgetary transfers
from the Federal Republic  and one-third through  borrowing of the GDR government. Most of
the financing of the FRG portion was to be carried out through a  "German Unity Fund" of
DM 115  billion, covering  expenditures  during 1990-94. The increase  in public  sector borrowing
for the economic  union (the German Unity Fund plus the borrowing by the GDR government
in its own name) was estimated  at slightly over 2% of West German GNP in  1991, and was
projected  to decline rapidly thereafter.- 13 -
Political Unification
Once  the  desolate  status  of  the  East  Germany  economy  became  evident  with  the
implementation  of  the monetary and  economic union on July  1,  1990, political pressures  to
accelerate  the unification  multiplied.  The  unification treaty was  negotiated in less  than two
months  and  signed  on  August  31,  and  went  into  effect  on  October 3,  1990.  It  was
complemented by a treaty with the former Allied Powers, settling the external aspects of German
unification and  reestablishing  full sovereignty.  The  treaty  included  only  a  few  substantive
changes in the laws and institutions of the Federal Republic, but many changes had to be made
to legal texts to reflect transitional provisions and extensions of authority to the new territories.
Rather than designing entirely new policies and institutions for the transition of eastern Germany
to a  market economy,  special support measures have generally been designed through simple
amendments of long  standing FRG  policies." 6 The unification treaty  accelerated  the przcess
of economic integration and provided additional financial assistance.  The "German Unity Fund"
was to  remain the principal source for  financial assistance to east Germany, but  in addition,
federal  expenditure  programs  were  now  extended  to  east  Germany and  the  social  security
systems were merged, providing an open-ended commitment to bear the social costs of economic
adjustments.
Public  Administration.  The unification treaty extended the restructuring process to the
public  sector.  Public administration  in  east Germany was remodeled according  to  the west
German  federal  system,  leading  to  an  entirely  new  government  structure.  Existing
administrative units were transferred to federal,  state and local levels in accordance with west
German practice.  Qualified personnel was retained only  according  to needs.  Civil  service
positions are now open to all Germans and appointments are to be made on merit.  Since salary
scales are lower in the new territories,  western states have made available qualified personnel
16  The measures  agreed  to  under the union and unification treaties had also  to be  consistent with European  Community laws and
regulations.  Temporary  derogations were granted  by the EC for some transitional  measures.- 14 -
on a secondment  basis.  East German government employees  will have to pass civil service
examinations  to obtain tenure.
Property and Privatization. The unification treaty provided further clarification of
property and ownership  issues. The general principle  adopted  was that  all expropriated  property
should  be restituted  to previous owners, whenever  possible. Several  exceptions  were made from
this principle, including (a) exclusion of property expropriated by Soviet occupation forces
during 1945-49  from restitution  (including  agricultural  estates, expropriated  dunng the 1949  land
"reform"); (b) compensation,  in lieu of restitution, whenever  property had been substantially
changed (e.g.,  built  up),  or  had  been acquired by  private citizens in  good faith;  and
(c) compensation,  in lieu of restitution, whenever  property  is needed  for "essential  investments"
(business,  public, housing), as certified by property restitution  agencies.
State property of the GDR has been assigned to various public bodies of the Federal
Republic, according  to their function. Ownership  rights over state enterprises had already been
assigned to the privatization agency (Treuhandanstalt). The postal and telecommunications
services have been merged, but the railways (Reichsbahn)  will be merged into the Federal
Railways only  at  a  later  date,  after restructuring (and lay-offs).' 7 State-owned housing
(excluding housing cooperatives) has  been transferred to  local governments for eventual
privatization. Assets  that are required for administrative  tasks  of various government  levels have
been assigned to them, all other state property (e.g., natural parks, forests) became federal
property.  Property previously owned by state and local governments  is to be returned.  All
liabilities of the GDR have been transferred into a special fund of the federal government.
Privatization proceeds are to be used to reduce these liabilities, with any residual liabilities
shared  equally  between  the federal  and the new state governments. An eventual  positivc  residual
from privatization  proceeds (after amortization  of past GDR state debts) is to be distributed  to
residents of eastern Germany (e.g.,  in  form of shares in former state enterprises).  It  is,
The government  wants  to combine  the m:rger of the railways  with a conversion  of the Fedeal Railways  into  company  satus, ad
termination  of civil  service status for railway  employe-es.  This requires,  however,  an amendment  of the constitution.- Is  -
however, very unlikely that the privatization  of state enterprises will leave a positive residual
(see below).
Public Finance.  The financing of the costs of unification was to be raised through
borrowing and expenditure reductions in other programs, rather than a tax increase, on the
theory that these are exceptional,  one-time  costs. In view of the DM 115 billion made available
through the German Unity Fund, the western states (LUnder)  refused at first to have the new
states participate on equal terms in revenue equalization,  but full participation was agreed to
after the elections. 18 All federal expenditure  programs have been expanded  to the new, eastern
half of the country. In addition, a number of special  assistance  programs for the new territories
have been agreed (or have been carried over from the first treaty). These include: a temporary
subsidy for  all  equipment investments (12% in  1991, 8%  in  1992), temporary special
depreciation allowances, inclusion in regional support programs for industrial and high-tech
service  sector  investments (up  to  23%  of  investment costs,  but  limited by  budgetary
allocations);' 9 subsidies of  up  to  90%  for  local  government investments in  business
infrastructure;  low interest credit programs for other local infrastructure investments;  low
interest credit programs for housing modernization; and financing for start-up assistance for
small- and medium  enterprises. One of the largest items is the open-ended  coverage of social
security expenditures through the  merged social security funds.  An  additional federal
infrastructure investment  and assistance  program for eastern Germany  was approved after the
elections in  March 1991.  The annual financing requirements for east Germany are  now
estimated  at around 4% of west German GNP for the next several years, twice the amount
projected before the union.
Is  Most German  taxes  are being shared according  to pre-set formulas  between  the federal,  state and local governments. In addition,
a revenue equalization  fund redistributes tax revenues among states according  to population  and 'needs.  The result is  a rather
homogeneous distribution of tax revenue to state and local governments,  on a per capita basis.
9  These programs have to meet European  Community  competition policy guidelines, limiting the extent of  investment subsidies  for
regional development programs.- 16 -
Social Issues.  The unification  treaty accelerates  and concludes the "social union" that
had already partly been established with the economic union treaty.  The national pension
systems are being merged in  1991.  Similarly, the health and accident insurance systems (a
mixture of compulsory  public ;md alternative  private Insurance)  is being extended to the east
during 1991, with lower service fees for a transitional  period.  Special provisions have been
made for partial lay-offs  and early retirement. Until the end of 1991, enterprises can partially
lay-off workers (who then receive partial unemployment  benefits) to avoid terminations and
unemployment. 20 But protection  against termination,  included in several collective  bargaining
agreements,  has been voided  and elapsed in mid-1991. Special pre-retirement  provisions  entail
a transitional  payment of 65% of net salaries for a period of up to three years for employees
over 57 years of age (now -. educed to 55 years).
C.  Macro-Economic Consequences  of Unification
Political  Choices
In the discussion  of the German  unification,  its most important  features have sometimes
been overlooked, particularly in comments  made by economists. These essential features are
political:  the relations between east and west Germany are not any more relations among
nations.  The citizens of the former GDR have become full and voting citizens of an enlarged
Federal Republic.  With one-fifth  of the voters, they have a considerable  weight in elections,
and politicians  who want to stay in power bette; listen to their concerns.
The key example in this regard is the discussion  on the "appropriate"  exchange rate at
the time of the monetary  union.  The 1:1 conversion  for current payments, roughly  equivalent
to a maintenance  of purchasing  power, has been widely criticized  as a mistake. Indeed, it was
a mistake, if the standard of judgement is one of self-help  and zero solidarity. With a recent
0  This was again done through a simple (but very liberal) amendment of a long-standing provision of the FRG unemployment insurance,
that provides partial unemployment compensation for temporary partial layoffs ('short-time  work').  As opposed to west Germany,
east German enterprises do not have to guarantee that the reduction in working hours is only temporary.- 17-
effective  exchange  rate of 4.40 M/DM, the monetary  union  represents  an appreciation  of 340%.
Left to its own devices, east Germany could never hope to compete and maintain macro-
economic stability at a  1:1 exchange rate (and wages one-third of west Germany's).  On the
other hand, east Germans are fairly well educated and trained, particularly  in technical fields.
Many east German scientist,  engineers, technicians  and craftsmen  have skills equivaletit  to their
west German counterparts, or need only limited additional training.  Taken individually,  and
transferred to  west  German firms,  many are  just  as  productive as  their  west  German
counterparts.  The  low productivity and  competitiveness of  the  GDR economy was  a
consequence  of the system. A radical  change in that system  can be expected  to raise productivity
rapidly, but even the most hurried implementation  will take 2-3 years before results will be
tangible.
During  this transition,  the concept  of average  productivity  is virtually  meaningless. Some
activities and firms are approaching  west German productivity  levels very rapidly, others will
take years. The essence  is that labor (and capital) is extremely  heterogeneous during the period
of transition. For example, east German workers along the former border are readily finding
work in west Germany,  at west German  wages (half a million  are now commuting  to the west).
For others, the commuting  would take too long. Some  have skills  that can be readily used (e.g.
engineers  and technicians),  others do not have marketable  skills, and need to be retrained (e.g.,
administrative  and commercial  personnel,  lawyers, party functionaries,  state  security  employees,
and so on).  Moreover, productivity changes will not happen smoothly.  Productivity will
probably take a leap in 2-3 years when the initial batch of investment projects will come to
fruition.
Lower wages would have saved many old, low productivity  jobs, but would have also
slowed economic  change in east Germany, and would have led to substantial  outmigration  of
those with readi.y marketable  skills. These are exactly  the people who are essential for a rapid
transformation  of the east German  economy.  The present "high" wages (roughly  50% of west
German wages, after  large wage increases in  1990 and  1991) will eliminate many low- 18 -
productivity  jobs,  increase adjustment  pressures on firms and the labor market, anid  are only
feasible with large fiscal transfers to finance adjustment  costs, and to provide incentives to the
private sector to switch investments  eastward.  The low income and the small size of  east
Germany (relative to west Germany)  makes this possible. 2'
Two other political factors must be kept in mind in discussing  the consequences  of the
unification. First, the monetary  union  and political  unification  treaties--both  very complex  legal,
political  and economic  agreements--were  negotiated  under  enortrous time pres-.,  in each case
in about six weeks.  Compromises  were made in some  respects in the full know.cdge  that those
were not durable solutions  to the problems, and that corrective action would be needed later.
Second,  politicians  inside and outside  government  realized keenly that one cannot win elections
with promises of hardship 22 or tax increases.  The severity of the adjustment  problems  in east
Germany  were thus glossed over before the elections. Realism  and plans for tax increases  were
on the table immediately  after the elections.
Macro-Economic Developments
The economic  consequences  of the sudden  switch  to a market  economy  were more severe
than expected. Actual developments  deviated from earlier expectations  in three major ways:
(a)  East German  consumers  switched  to a far larger extent  than expected  to imported
(west German) goods, "abandoning  themselves"  as producers.
21  A simple  back-of-the-envelopecalculation  makes  the point:  at a 1:1 conversion  of past net wages  into DM (equivalentto  40% of west
German  net wages),  the cost of the total east German  wage bill is about 100 DM billion,  or 4.8% of west Gennan GNP.  A fiSal
transfer of that magnitude,  while large, is economically  feasible,  and it would thus be possible  to put the entire cast German  labor
force out of work, at 100%  unemployment  compensation.
22  Except,  perhaps, in the case of external  aggression. See Churchill's  promise  of 'blood, sweat  and tep-s-.- 19 -
(b)  Wage settlements, resulting from collective bargaining agreements, increased
wages by one-third during 1990, and another third during 1991, raising pre-tax
wages to about one-half west German levels by mid-1991.
(c)  Exports to  the  Soviet Union,  which had  been  counted upon  to  maintain
employment  during the transition,  sharply declined  with the switch  to convertible
currency trade in early 1991, and the economic dislocation within the Soviet
Union.
The first two of these factors were internal to the unification  process, and could perhaps
have been anticipated. But they were not. The third factor is an unexpected  external shock that
is increasing  adjustment  costs, directly  through reduction  in export earnings, plant closures  and
increased  unemployment;  and indirectly, through sharply lowered  expectations  about the future
of the Soviet market and, consequently,  reduced attractiveness  of east German enterprises for
west German and foreign investors.  These unexpected  developments  have, in turn, affected
other variables.  The most important was the drastic decline in manufacturing  output, which
slumped  by half immediately  after the economic  union, and by another third at the end of 1990,
when export commitments  to the Soviet Union expired.
Shifting Demand. The sharp decline in manufacturing  output was the combined effect
of the sudden  opening  to external  trade, which made many  east German  products  uncompetitive,
and the pent-up demand of east German residents for western goods.  Sometimes, quality
differences  were only perceived, and attributed to the packaging  and brand names of western
products, 23 but often, they were real.  It had also to do with rapidly shifting  demand patterns:
people reduced consumption  of formerly subsidized  items (e.g., restaurants)  to buy previously
unavailable,  or high priced, western  consumer  durables  (audio-visual  equipment,  cars, fuirniture,
appliances, etc.).  The number of registered cars increased by nearly one million  (239%)  in the
first six months of the union.  Consumers  also made a large part of their purchases on we:kAly
23  East German  citizens had been watching  West German  TV,  including  advertising, for decades.- 20-
shopping  trips to the west as east German  retailers were not yet competitive  on choice and price.
Finally, the switch to modem tnarketing  techniques  and western quality standards led to some
temporary adjustment problems. 24 Gradually, these problems are  being overcome, and
manufacturing  output has increased for the first time in June 1991. Surveys of manufacturers
indicate a 30% increase in turnover for the second half of 1991.
Table 4:  East Germany: Manufacturing Output
1989:  100.0
1990:  June  85.7
July  55.8
December  49.2
1991:  January  35.1
June  32.7
Sources: Bundesbank - Monatsberichte; Joint Statistical Office, Berlin.
Wages. The effect of the high wage  settlements  resulting  from the first "free" collective
bargaining  round is more difficult  to assess since it happened  simultaneously  with the monetary
union, and its incremental  impact  is thus hard to assess.  At the margin, it has made more  jobs
redundant, thus increasing  uiiemployment. It may also have reduced inflows of private capital
and investment.  But the extent is difficult to gauge.  The higher purchasing power of east
German consumers  is also increasing  consumer spending  and tax revenues, creating additional
business opportunities  and attracting additional investment. The main effect has been to take
purchasing  power from the pockets of well heeled west Germans, and put it into the pockets of
their poorer eastern brethren.
Long-term  collective  bargaining  agreements,  concluded  in the spring of 1991, provide
for an increase  of east German wages to about 60% of west German contract wages in mid-
1991, rising to 100% of west German contract wages by 1994.  However, average effective
wages average only 47% of west German levels in 1991, and are expected to reach 80% by
2'  For example,  supermarkets  simply did not order products  without bar-coded  product numbers  (facilitating automnatic  check-out  and
inventory  management).- 21 -
1991, as bonuses  and benefits will reach full parity with west Germany  only after 1994 (Table-
5).  The difference in part also reflects job grading, with a larger percentage of east German
employees  rated in more  junior job categories. 25
Table 5:  East Germany: Contract and Effective Wages, 1990-94
(percent of west German wages)
Year  Contract  Effective
Wage a/  Wage
Actual:  1989  - 33
1990- 2nd  half  S0  41
1991  60  47
Projected:  1992  70  55
1993  80  65
1994  100  80
3/  Approximate average of sectoral collective bargaining agreements.  Only the (pace-setting) metal industry and the textile industry agreements
cover the entire four year period 1991-94.  Agreements are different in some sectors or regions, for  example, the construction industry in east
Bc:lin (70-75% in 1991).
Source: German Federation of Employers.
The effects of collective  bargaining  agreements  since the monetary union have been far
more important determinants of present wage levels in east Germany than the 1:1 currency
conversion: wages in mid-1991  are 75% higher than a year earlier.  While it could be argued
that the 1990 collective  bargaining agreements reflected negotiations  between the unions and
"agents  without  principals", that is, managers  of state enterprises  with nobody fulfilling  the role
of owners; this cannot be said for the 1991 bargaining  round: important segments  of lhe east
German economy  were already privatized (commerce,  banking, utilities, some manufacturing)
and the ownership function  for state enterprises  had been  clearly lodged  in the Treuhandanstalt.
Employer "ssociations either believe that the agreed wages are  feasible, or are  behaving
irresponsibly.
25  lhe  collective  bargaining agreements can be terminated  by both  sides with three months notice and could, in  tieory,  be revised
downward,  if the agreed  wages have unacceptable consequences on employment.- 22-
Comecon Trade.  The external shock of reduced Soviet demand hit east Germany  in
January 1991. Until then, export commitments  under the annual bilateral  trade agreement with
the Soviet Union were honored, albeit at the cost of large subsidies  (totalling  DM 4 billion for
the second half of 1990). The termination  of CMEA barter agreements  at the end of 1990 led
to  a  further sizeable decline in  industrial output (Table 4),  mostly due  to  the economic
dislocations  and uncertainty  in the Soviet Union. East German  imports  from Comecon  countries
had declined  already immediately  after the monetary  union  as demand for domestic  goods (using
Comecon inputs) collapsed. The Federal Republic  has offered to compensate  Comecon trade
partners for canceled contracts.  The effect of  the unification on  other eastern European
countries has been far less than has been feared.  Total (west and east) German imports from
eastern Europe  in the second half of 1990  were already substantially  higher than  in 1989  (+5%),
reflecting  both a switch  to west Germani  distribution  channels  and buoyant  west German  import
demand in the wake of unification. 26 Early reformers benefitted most: German imports from
Poland increased by 46% in  1990, equivalent  to 200% of past Polish exports to the GDR.V
Strong double-digit  growth of imports from eastern Europe has continued in 1991.
Changing  Economic Forecasts
The press and some of the outside observers have characterized the aftermath of the
unification  as a "disaster" 28 and some have even likened developments  in east Germany to the
depression  of the 1930s. 29 The latter misses the point that only the production of shoddy  and
unwanted  goods is declining, while consumption  is leaping at totally unprecedented  rates.  A
better picture of the expected and unexpected consequences  can be obtained by comparing
successive forecasts of economic developments  prepared by one of the "Big Five" German
25  Valuing  past CMEA  imports  :nto the GDR at the effective  exchange  rate of 4.4 Mark/DM.
27  At the TRYS  crossrate  used in Polish  trade  statistics  (2.96 TR/$), presumably  reflecting  Polish costs.
2'  For example,  Mr. Pohl,  the President  of the Bindersbank  (In trying to argue against  rapid  European  monetary  union).
29  For example,  Akerlofet al. (1991).-23 -
economic research  institutes, DIW  (Table 6).3°  Successive DIW  forecasts show which
consequences  of the unification  had been correctly forecast,  and where errors were made. They
also show a swing to pessimism  during the winter, when most of the unification  news seemed
to be bad, and a correction towards more optimistic  views, once investment  intentions became
clearer, and unification was put on sounder fiscal feet after the elections. Actual outcomes  in
1991 are now likely to be somewhat  more favorablt than in the June 1991 forecast.
On the employment  front, the extent of overmanning  has been underestimated. Early
projections forecast the maintenance  of artificially high labor force participation, particularly
among  women. This proved wrong. Total labor force participation  has rapidly declined  to west
German  levels. The loss of jobs was concentrated  in the manufacturing  sector, where about  one-
half of all jobs will be lost by the end of 1991. Total working hours have declined even more
rapidly than output, yielding  considerable  productivity  gains in 1991, and reveal the extent of
hidden  unemployment  in past work practices. Earlier  fears that the large number  of terminations
at the end of June 1991 (half a million)  would lead to further large increases  in unemployment
have not materialized. Since mid-1991, open unemployment  has held constant at about one
million, while the number of short-time  workers has continued to decline  rapidly (from a peak
of 2 million  in April to 1.3 million in September). However, government financed  retraining
and employment  programs account for a large part of the reduction in short time work.
30  Fortunately,  DIW staff were courageous  enough to forecast  full-flcdged  national  accounts  for east Germany,  even before the economic
union, and on the basis of rather  shaky east Gernan statistics.  Other research institutes,  the Ministry of Economics and  the Cmuncfl
of Economic Advisors were more pnident and have made only very summary and qualitative  forecasts.- 24 -
Table 6:  East Germany: DIW Projections of Key Economic Indicators  1990-1991
1990  1991
Projection date:  June  June  January  June
1990  Actual  1990  1991  1991
Output (% change):
GNP (cur,.nt  prices)  -7  -16  -2  -16  -16
- investment  12  -3  31  IS  17
- exports  -t5  13  -10  -23  -9
- imports  16  70  34  34  76
Employment (% change):
Employed  -8  -10  -16  -21  -23
Hours worked  -9  -16  -19  -30  -39
Productivity  -7  -5  -3  1S  24
Employed  (million)  8.6  8.8  7.2  6.9  6.8
Unemployrient Rate (%) _/  6  7  22  26  24
Public Finances (DM billion) b/
Expenditures  140  162  166  205  226
- Transfer  payments  el  56  83  73  119  112
Revenues  86  87  97  107  100
Fanncing gap  54  75  69  98  126
(% of east German  GNP)  20  31  26  50  56
(% of west Gernan GNP)  2  3  3  4  4
Fiscal transfers  32  44  42  58  115
Other  ruancing  22  31  27  30  11
Full time equivalent  of unemployed  and sb-rt time  workers  as percent  of labor force.
National  accounts  definition  (territorial  authorities,  special  fiunds  and social security  system, but excluding  government  enterprises
and govenmnent  lending).
£/  To households  and enterprises.
Sources: DIW  Wochenbericht  26/90, 1-3/91,  26-27/91
Forecasters  also failed  to foresee  the sharp decline  in manufacturing  output and were too
optimistic about the timing of the recovery.  Early forecasts have not adequately taken into
account  that planning  and approval  of most investments  takes some  time. Investment  activity  has
remained  flat for the first twelve months  of the union, but is expected to increase by about 40%
in  the  second  half  of  1991.  Early  infrastructure investments were  concentrated in- 25 -
telecommunications  and railway  rehabilitation  where lead times were short, but large investment
projects are now in advanced  planning stages.
Forecasters also underestimated  me fiscal consequences  of the unification, but by less
than has been suggested by the press.  At the time of the initial forecast, unification was
generally expected for sometime in  1991, and the projections were made on an economic
community,  rather than unified  country, basis--involving  a far lower extent of burden sharing.
The earlier forecast included a substantial  unidentified "other financing"  gap that had not yet
been covered by West German government  commitments  and would have had to be raised by
borrowing in the name of the GDR, and would have eventually  become  a liability  of the FRG.
Comparisons  of the financing  agreed  under the "German  Unity Fund" (covering  only part of the
forecast fiscal deficit) and later estimates  of the total fiscal gap are thus misleading. The main
change between the early and mid-1991 forecasts is  the fiscal consolidation (through tax
increases) of a long forecast, but yet uncovered,  financing  gap.
The principal items in increased spending  are higher transfer payments  to unemployed
and pensioners, mostly  due to higher than expected  wages (to which social security benefits  are
tied), a more pronounced  decline in employment  (cushioned  by a number of one-time social
measures, such as generu ;s early retirement benefits), accelerated infrastructure investment
programs, and  expanded incentives for private  investors (Table 6).  Total government
expenditures in  1991 are  now expected to  be  less than  forecast in  mid-1991, because
infrastructure investment have taken more time to plan, and labor market developments  are
somewhat more favorable.  The public sector borrowing requirement has also been revised
downward, as government  revenues have been more buoyant than expected.
The Costs of Unification
A lot of confusion  has arisen about the "costs" of the German unification,  and costs and
benefits are  often liberally confused, or  even added up.  Strictly speaking, the  costs of- 26 -
unification are  only  what economists would call  deadweight losses, such as  transitional
unemployment  arising from a rapid change  in economic  policies  and signals. Alternatively,  one
could take into account all costs (expenditures),  but then also needs to take into account all
benefits  as well.  Different  approaches  to economic  reforms will involve different  time paths of
cost and benefit streams.  Rapid reforms are likely to create larger costs early on, but earlier
and larger benefits. More gradual reforms may  involve  lower costs up-front, but also lower  and
later benefits. An obvious strategy is to try to minimize  deadweight  losses, such as transitional
unemployment. But even this should be done only to the extent to which it does not reduce
benefits, or increase other costs, by a larger margin.  A strategy entailing higher transitional
unemployment  may thus be preferable, if it leads to more rapid restructuring  of the economy
and higher productivity  earlier on 3 ".
A lower conversion rate at the time of monetary union, and lower subsequent wage
settlements,  would  have  clearly  involved  lower  costs for west Germans  (and  concomitantly  lower
benefits for east Germans).  But the adopted "high cost" solution may yet turn out to be
beneficial  to west Germans  too, if the costs are made up by more rapid productivity  growth in
west  Germany, resulting,  for example, from economies  of scale in an enlarged  domestic  market,
from a  reduction  in  uneconomic expenditures (e.g.,  coal  mining  subsidies or  defense
expenditures),  or from further  deregulation  (for example, in telecommunications,  labor markets,
or transport).  There are some signs that the large costs of the unification  for west German tax
payers may yet lead to a political consensus to tackle longstanding,  but politically seemingly
immovable,  waste and inefficiencies. If it happens, the net benefits from unification  may yet
be positive for west Germans too.
D.  Micro-Economic  Consequences  of Unification
3  Conceptually,  this c, uld be measured  as discounted  incremental  national  income,  resulting  from such a sttategy.  In view of the
uniqueness  of the reforms,  costs and benefits  are impossible  to quantify  accurately.- 27 -
The most important  lessons from a micro-economic  perspective  are that the productivity
and competitiveness  of state enterprises has turned out to be far worse than expected, and that
the restructuring  process is taking longer. In the discussions  before the monetary union, some
economists  and policy-makers  had likened the situation to the 1948 monetary reform in the
Federal Republic, and expected  a rapid increase  in production  and investment,  once the "magic
of the market" was permitted to work.  That was a misplaced  analogy. In 1948, the German
economy  was a potentially  functioning  market economy--despite  the intervening  war years and
war-related economic  controls, and had already recovered from the collapse at the end of the
war.  Most importantly, entrepreneurs  and managers, fully conversant  with market practices,
were still in place.  Technological  progress had continued in the interim, albeit for the wrong
purposes. Even the productive  capital stock  corresponded  approximately  to 1939  levels, despite
war-related damage, due  to  the  massive investments during the  war  years. 32 A  more
appropriate comparison  is thus 1945-46,  but reliable data are not available for West Germany
for the immediate  post-war  period. In the United  States, industrial  production  declined by 55%
in late 1945.33 In this perspective, the slump of east German industrial production (by 65%)
does not look all that exceptional. The recovery will, of course, take longer since it involves
not only retooling from wartime to civil production, but the introduction  of an entirely new
system.
Forty years of command economy  has led to a totally ill-adapted  and inadequate  capital
stock, and to totally different  management  and work practices,  and entrepreneurs  have virtually
disappeared. East Germany has the advantage  that the legal bases were introduced  overnight
(property rights, civil and commercial codes, company law, etc.).  Moreover, these legal
institutions  are beginning to function properly within a year or two, due to massive help and
training provided by west German professionals  (civil servants, accountants,  lawyers, judges,
etc.).  After a chaotic start in 1990, considerable  progress has also been made in establishing
a functioning  public administration. This is not only demonstrated  by the breathtaking  speed  of
n  Abelshauser (1991).
"  See Schatz and Schmidt (1991).- 28 -
privatization transactions (see below), but across the whole range of government services.
Western managers  and investors  have  generally  high  praise for the training  and skills  of technical
personnel, and the dedication  and quick learning  of middle-level  managers. The most difficult
problem is to find competent  and experienced  top managers.
Industry
The desolate  status  of industry  is only now  being fully appreciated. Earlier expectations,
particularly among east German officials, were that the privatization  of industry would yield
considerable  sales revenues, and clauses were inserted into the union and unification  treaties,
granting east German citizens the residual from the sales bonanza, once enterprise and state
debts had been paid off.  That residual is probably going to be a negative number. At one-half
west German wages, almost  all east German industrial  state enterprises  are making losses. The
key element in the restructuring of nearly all firms is a reduction in the labor force.  As
elsewhere in eastern Europe, early expectations  were that one-third of the enterprises could
become competitive  without much restructuring,  another third needed  extensive rehabilitation,
and another third would have to be closed. This has proven wrong. Most manufacturing  firms
need to lay-off around one-half of their labor force, with relatively little variation. In a survey
of enterprises in mid-1991,  expected lay-offs  due to restructuring  ranged from 65% in the steel
and textile  industries, to "only" 30% in printing and woodworking,  with most subsectors  in the
40-60% range.  On the other hand, fewer enterprises  will need to be entirely liquidated,  but lay-
offs may be as much as 80-90% of the labor force in some cases.
The lay-offs  are in about equal parts due to true overstaffing,  in the sense that the same
amount can be readily produced with fewer people, and the far flung role of socialist firms,
catering for many worker needs that can be delivered  more efficiently  by small and specialized
firms.  The low level of productivity  is not primarily due to low levels of skills and training  of
the  work  force  (as in  poor  countries), but  due  to  inadequate incentives, inappropriate
organization  and irrational work practices, fostered by a utopian ideology.- 29 -
The reduction in employment is particularly dramatic in sectors where autarky and
autonomous  technology  development  has been pursued, for example, in much of the chemical
and steel industries, or microelectronics,  and in labor-intensive  industries which should have
been gradually phased-out years ago, for example, shipbuilding  or textiles.  Some of these
industries  are geographicaliy  concentrated  and their closure  or restructuring  will have important
consequences  for the local labor market: unemployment  is likely to be concentrated  in a few
depressed areas  that  were  until  now the  pillars of  industrial development.  Short-term
employment prospects are best in  construction related branches (metal and woodvorldng,
cement, etc.) and in industries producing for local markets (food industry, printing).  Skill-
intensive sectors (machinery,  automobiles,  electrical, some chemicals) have good longer-term
prospects, but need new technology  and products.
Agriculture
The above characterization  of the industrial  sector applies fully to the agricultural  sector
as well.  It is simply  one of the labor-intensive  sectors that should  have been restructured  years
ago.  Even at  the  high European agricultural prices, east  Germany's agriculture is  not
competitive with other European producers.  At present, about  60% of  the agricultural
cooperatives  are operating at a loss (around 30% were operating at a loss already before the
economic union).  The reason is simple:  )verstaffing.  Agricultural employment in  East
Germany  was 14  per hundred  hectare, compared  to 2 in West Germany,  and this despite  the fact
that 93% of the agricultural land was farmed  by huge cooperatives  and state farms, rather than
by too many small family farms--West  Germany's agricultural dilemma.  Most of the former
agricultural production cooperatives have converted to a  new legal form, and  10-15% are
presently being dissolved.
Property issues do not seem to be the major problem.  One half of the agricultural  land
is again private property of cooperative  members,  another fifth belongs  to other private persons
and one quarter is under administration  of the privatization  agency.  As of mid-1991,  property- 30-
title remains uncertain  for only 6% of the agricultural  land area.  The principal problem is that
few cooperative  members  are willing  to take the plunge  and become  agro-entrepreneurs. Most
were agricultural  workers, and do not have the confidence  that they can survive in a competitive
market place.  Only 3,500 family farms had been created by mid-1991.
The restructuring  of agricultural  cooperatives  will need to be as extensive  as for industrial
enterprises. The separation  of plant and animal production will need to be reversed, the huge
production  units (up to 5,000 hectare) need to be broken apart, and many non-agricultural  units
need to be split off from the basic business. Agricultural  employment  has already been reduced
by 30%, and one-half  of the remaining  agricultural  laDor  force is on partial unemployment. The
agricultural  labor force needs to be reduced  by at least another  40% before farming can become
profitable. Fortunately,  only one-fifth  of the cooperative  members  are land owners. This should
help to ease the required reduction  in the labor force.  A number of west German farmers have
taken advantage  of the large tracts of land that are becoming available, and have moved their
business east.
Services
The brightest short-term  prospects are in commerce  and services.  Tne privatization  of
commerce and  service establishments  is practically completed (see below), employment in
banking and insurance is already growing, and a large number of new businesses are being
created (about 400,000 by mid-1991),  mostly concentrated  in commerce, services and crafts.
The privatization  of the health sector  is also progressing  faster than expected:  half of all doctors
have already established  a private practice, and another third have applied for a license.  But
most of these serviceq are local services, and depend on other economic  activities for their
survival. For business services that could become  part of the "economic  base", the situation  is
not much  better than in industry or agriculture:  they also need a considerable  infusion  of up-to-
date technology  and management  skills.-3i  -
Housing  reform is not yet underway. Rent controls  remain the most important  exception
from the rapid switch to market principles. As a first measure, maintenance  and heating costs
have been increased  to full cost recovery  in October 1991. This will raise housing  cost by about
250%, and will increase  the share of household  income devoted to housing from 2.4% in mid-
1991 to about 8%--still less than half the west German average.  Ownership for most of the
public housing stock has been transferred to local governments for eventual privatization. As
long as rents remain far below market  values, the incentive  to buy is not very strong. Mortgage
debt is about DM 50 billion (DM 10,000 per apartment) and could be easily assumed by the
future owners.  The costs of required renovations  to meet western housing standards  are more
substantial  (DM 40,000 per unit), but far less than the costs of new apartments (around DM
150,000).
Privatization
Privatization  requires both, a clear attribution  of ownership  rights and the creation of a
competitive  environment to ensure that the new owners and managers behave in a  socially
desirable manner. In east Germany,  this task has been made easier by the wholesale  importation
of the west German legal and institutional  framework. Privatization  can thus focus on the more
immediate  task of bringing-in  competent  management  and up-to-date  technology. The preferred
option is thus the sale of  state enterprises to  successful west German and foreign firms.
However, other privatization techniques are also considered, where appropriate, including
management  and employee  buy-outs,  particularly for smaller enterprises. Maximizing  sales is
not the principal or overriding  objective. The speed  of transition  and rapid gains  in employment
are  essential.  The quality of the business plan proposed by potential acquirers is thus of
overriding importance.
After some initial difficulties,  the privatization  of state enterprises in east Germany  has
moved  into full gear in early 1991. Since the beginning  of 1991, about 300 larger enterprises
are being sold by the privatization  agency (Treuhandanstalt)  every month.  About one-third of- 32 -
the 8,000 state enterprises  have  been privatized  in the first twelve  months. An additional 15,000
commercial and  service establishments  have also  been privatized--mostly under leasehold
arrangement.
Organization.  While Treuhandanstalt  had existed for a few months as a state property
agency, it was given a clear privatization  mandate and organizational  structure only in June
1990. The head office in Berlin  has direct responsibility  for the largest 3,600 enterprises--those
with more than 1,500 employees, plus subsidiaries of large firms and enterprises in special
sectors (utilities, financial  institutions, state farms, department stores).  All other enterprises
report to 15 regional  offices. Managers  of the regional  offices have full ownership  responsibili-
ties for the enterprises under their control and can negotiate  sales with acquirers.  Only large
transactions  require approval  by the head office. The same principle  applies in the head office:
some  transactions  can be approved  by d&artment directors, some  require approval  of one or two
executive board members, and only a few large  transactions require approval by the  full
executive  board, and some  by the supervisory  board.  Special  subsidiaries  have been created for
the privatization  of commercial  and service establishments  and for real estate marketing.
Initial Difriculties.  The monetary  reform and the unexpectedly  large shift of consumers
to imported  west German  goods  created  severe liquidity  squeeze  for enterprises. Treuhandanstalt
had to provide liquidity  credits  (actually,  credit guarantees)  to give enterprise  managements  some
breathing space until conditions had settled.  Since the old enterprise supervision  and control
mechanisms  had collapsed  in the months  before the union, Treuhandanstalt  had extremely little
information  on  the enterprises under its control.  One of the first tasks was to establish a
managen.ent  information  system. In the interim, some  privatization  transactions  were concluded,
but mostly  in reaction to acquisition  proposals made by investors. Property restitution  claims
by former owners also created problems, particularly  as long as claims had not yet been filed
and  registered.  Finally,  the initial lack  of  a  functioning public administration and  the
shortcomings of  east  German infrastructure (such as  the  telephone system)  hampered
privatization for much of the first year.- 33 -
Enterprise  Management  and Control.  One of the first tasks was to convert all state
enterprises to company status ("commercialization"). This happened  automatically  on July 1,
1990, when the economic  laws of the Federal Republic were extended to the GDR. However,
since state enterprises did not fulfil registration requirements under FRG company law, they
remained in a provisional status, until they met these requirements (in particular, approved
financial  statements,  minimum  capital, functioning  management  and board). A special "opening
balance sheet  law" was enacted  to facilitate  the transition  to FRG accounting  standards  and other
requirements of FRG company law.  Treuhand has appointed chairmen for the supervisory
boards of the 500 largest  companies,  who have, in turn, be asked to appoint the other members
(in large companies, part of the supervisory  board members are elected by employees). The
existing management  has in most cases  remained  in place, but on short term contracts, to permit
rapid management  transfers at the time of privatization.
To give the larger enterprises and conglomerates  an incentive to  divest unessential
businesses, the "opening  balance sheet law" included  a number  of provisions that require more
equity  capital  for conglomerates  than for independent  companies. Financial  incentives  have also
been built-in to release  valuable  land that is not required for productive  purpose. However, few
managers  responded  to these incentives  to restructure  and spin-off unessential  activities. Since
many enterprises and conglomerates  are heavily indebted, most need some debt relief, and this
gave Treuhand an opportunity  to restructure large companies  or holdings under its powers as
creditor.  Since sales transactions for parts of enterprises (as opposed to  subsidiaries with
separate legal personality)  are legally  quite cumbersome,  a special law has been introduced  to
facilitate  splitting former state enterprises into a number  of separate  companies.
Privatization Experience.  While privatization transactions have started immediately
after the economic  union, the normal legal, economic  and financial  preconditions  for merger and
acquisition  activities have been missing  for most of the first year.  Accounting  systems had to
be established, financial  statements  had to be prepared and audited, property rights needed to
be clarified, and so on.  Moreover, the unsettled economic conditions rendered valuation- 34-
questions  difficult.  Real  estate  markets  with  settled  prices  did  not  yet  exist,  the  future
profitability of most enterprises was highly uncertain, and external events, such as the collapse
of Comecon tradc, quickly turned business plans into useless paper.  Since speed was essential,
quite a  nurrber  of corners  had  to be  cut without, however, jeopardizing  the legal validity of
transactions or the transparency of the process.
Priority was initially given to a few key sectors, such as energy utilities, and to respond
to concrete acquisition proposals made by investors, usually on the basis of direct contacts with
enterprise  managers,  while  at  the same  time  preparing  the  information  basis  for  "normal"
privatization transactions later on.  "First come, first served" was, by necessity, the initial sales
strategy.  While  "large" privatization transactions averaged  "only" seventy per months during
the second half of 1990, they accelerated to 300-400 per months during 1991 (Table 7), or about
ten times the level of merger and acquisition activity in west Germany.
Table  7:  "Large"  Privatization  Transactions,  1990 and  1991 (to July)
Number  Sales Proceeds  Employment  Investment
Commitment  Commitment
(DM billion)  (thousand)  (DM bi'lion)
1990  408  2.9  200  43  g/
1991 (to July)  2,578  8.6  350  2S
Total  2,986  11.5  550  68
of which:
Central office  833  9.5  415  63
Regional offces  2,153  2.0  135  5
I/  including DM 30 billion for the electric power sector.
Source: Treuhandanstalt
Privatization Techniques.  All possible privatization  techniques are being considered
with  the overriding  objective  to  ensure  a  rapid transformation  of  the economy by  fostering
individual responsibility and initiative, and bringing in capital, technology and management and
marketing know-how.  Most  large  transactions  to  date  have been  negotiated  sales  to  west
German or foreign firms.  A large number of management or employee buy-outs have de-facto
already taken place in the privatization of the commercial sector, and management buy-outs.35  -
are also pursued for smaller industrial firms.  However, previous managers  often cannot cope
with the new competitive  market environment. Public share offerings are not possible for the
time being, as none of the firms under Treuhand's control  can fulfil the requirements  for a stock
exchange  listing (including  audited and approved  financial  statements  for at least three business
years).  The possibility  of future stock  market flotations  is not excluded, but these will probably
be very  few.  Private placements are,  however, possible, for example, in  the context of
management/employee  buy-outs.
Valuation.  While homogeneous  assets, such as land, commercial  real estate, or "good
will" of shop  locations, can be sold through  competitive  bidding  procedures, this is typically  not
the case with industrial firms.  In view of the required deep restructuring, a valuation  on the
basis of expected future profits is in most cases meaningless. The value of the firm "as is" is
in most cases simple the liquidation value of the firms assets (reflected in the "opening DM
balance sheets"), minus the social 'sosts of job redundancies,  and is often a negative value.
Potential  acquirers  usually  propose rather different  business  plans, involving  different  strategies,
with different implicit  levels of investment  and employment. Comparing  alternative  proposals
thus requires an evaluation. The liquidation  value (minus  costs of lay-offs) represents  a lower
bound of the purchase  price. The most useful  approach  is often a "partial reconstruction"  value,
i.e.  comparing the required incremental  investment costs with the costs of an expansion or
"green-field"  investment  elsewhere. This gives  a rough estimate  of the opportunity  costs to the
investor that may be the best indicator of the value of the firm to the investor.  The value of
alternative business plans to  Treuhandanstalt  (and the government) is reflected by  making
appropriate allowances for the number of jobs  saved and the volume of investment to be
undertaken.
Enforcing commitments.  To ensure that business  plans are not merely on paper, sales
contracts usually contain a few contingency  clauses that allow for later adjustments in the
purchase price, if the investor does not meet his promises. These usually  include the volume
of investment to be implemented  and the number of jobs created or preserved.  For example,- 36 -
contracts  may include a penalty clause, increasing  the sales price by an amount  equivalent  to 1-2
years of salary per job, if employment  does not reach the levels promised  by the acquirer, and
similar  clauses  are being used  to enforce investmcnt  commitments. Revaluation  clauses  for land
have also frequently been used, particularly if ark enterprise had a  lot of  inner-city land.
However, since land prices have now become more settled, land revaluation clauses are
employed less often.  On the other hand, Treuhand usually retains a considerable  part of past
liabilities, such  as excessive  debt burden, or costs of reducing  overmanning. While the contract
usually  stipulates  a positive price, this may, economicaly speaking,  quite often entail a negative
price.  Contingent  liabilities from environmental  risks, such as soil contamination,  are also
mostly retained by Treuhand, but usually with a  small participation ("coinsurance")  of  the
acquirer to keep some  incentive  to minimize  clean-up  costs. Beyond  this, sales are on a as "seen
and inspected"  basis, to limit future litigation.
Foreign Investors. While it is a declared  objective  of the government  to attract as many
foreign investors  as possible, it has not been very successful. Only 5 % of the sales transactions
(but involving 10% of the privatized  jobs) have been to foreign investors. Part of the reason
has been that Treuhand had initially  no other choice than to pursue a "first come, first served"
policy, and west German investors had a practical advantage  in scouting  potential deals at the
grass roots level.  It also reflects language  and cultural barriers, as fully one-third of all sales
to foreign firms involve Austrian and Swiss firms.  Foreign investors also tend to be more
cautious.  In many cases, restructuring will take several years before the companies will be
profitable, and investors from some countries have a rather short-term  perspective.
Investment  Requirements
The economic success of the German unification  depends  to - large  extent  on whether
or not a large number of high productivity  jobs can be created within a short period of 2-3
years.  Investment in new equipment and facilities is an important element in  raising the
productivity  of the east German economy, but other elements are just as important, such as- 37-
better incentives,  better  organization  and management,  and selective  retraining  of the labor force.
As discussed  earlier, hopes of a quick recovery, similar to the aftermath of the 1948 currency
reform, were exaggerated. The east German  economy  requires  far more  extensive  restructuring,
both  physically and  organizationally.  On  the  other  hand,  a  number  of  authors have
overestimated  the investment  needed  to bring productivity  closer in line with west  German levels
by applying  economy-wide  capital-output  ratios.3' These authors have overlooked  an important
characteristic  of the capital stock: productivity  depends  essentially  on a relatively small part of
the physical capital  stock. A large part of the capital  stock serves mostly  consumptive  purposes,
not only housing, but a good part of urban, transport and other infrastructure  as well.
Table 8 shows  the value and compocition  of the west  German  capital stock  at replacement
costs (expressed  as percent of GDP) to make the point.  Fixed assets of the industrial sector
(excluding  energy utilities) ar! only about 11  % of the net fixed capital stock (but 20% of new
investment).  The reason is the large share of (short-lived)  machinery and equipment in the
capital  stock  of the industrial  sector. Other  sectors  are more  capital-intensive  than manufacturing
because of  the importance of  (long-lived) buildings in  their capital stock.  This  has two
consequences  for the privatization  and restructuring  of the east German  economy  that were not
always fully understood.  First, the value of the "productive" capital stock is actually rather
small.  Second, a considerable  amount of investment  can be postponed  to later years (without
much effect on productivity),  as demand for infrastructure  services is to a considerable  degree
determined  by income  and wealth  (e.g., the number  of private cars and urban traffic  congestion).
In the negotiations  leading  to the unification,  the GDR negotiators  and public opinion  did
not want to give away the productive  capital stock of east Germany, and a clause was insered
in the treaty, granting the east German  population  a share in the national  wealth, once past debt
obligations  had been met.  These demands were in part prompted by CDR statistics, showing
"  For example, McDonald,  Donogh and Thumann  (1990).- 38 -
the value of the industrial capital stock as GDR Mark 800 billion, or 50,000  per capita. 35
However, this was the gross (undepreciated)  value, the net value (using GDR depreciation
schedules)  was only 365 billion.  Its market value in DM is far less since GDR depreciation
rates were too low, many  capital-intensive  facilities  were uneconomic  and obsolete,  and imported
equipment  had been accounted  at the implicit  exchange  rate (4.4 M/DM in 1989). Using west
German net capital/GDP relations, one would expect the industrial capital siock to be worth
around DM 120 billion.  As enterprise debt, after conversion at 2:1, is also around DM 100
billion, the net value of  industrial enterprises is rather close to zero,  with the actual sign
depending on  the  sharing of  past  liabilities (enterprise debt,  compensation for  lay-offs,
environmental  cleanup)  between the privatization  agency and the purchasers.
"  See GDR Statistical Ycarbook,  1990, p. 
118 .- 39 -
Table 8:  West Germany:  Net (Depreciated)  Value of the Capital Stock, 1988
Net Replacement  Share of
Value  Equipment
(% of GDP)  (%)
Agriclture  6  40
Industry a;  34  61
Manufacturing  30
Services  72  21
Commerce  10
Business  and Personal  Services  40
Public Administration  22
Infrastructure  b/  63  16
Electricity,  Gas, Water  13
Transport  29
Communications  6
Urban and other  15
Housing  132




_/  Excluding  electricity,  gas and water (included  under infrastructure)
k/  Including  the net value of civil works  for roads and urban infrastructure  (excluded  in the detailed  national  accounts  tables)  and assurning
the  same rate of depreciation  as for 'other buildings'.
Source:  Gernan Statistical  Office:  National  Accounts,  Statistical  Yearbook.
Table 8 also shows that the bulk of valuable assets is the other categories, in particular,
housing,  other real estate, infrastructure  and urban land.  Most  of these assets are not under the
control of the privatization  agency  and will either stay in public  hands (infrastructure,  hospitals,
public buildings), or have been transferred to  local governments for eventual privatization
(housing),  or can be privatized  only gradually  (urban and agricultural  land). While much  of the
non-industrial  capital stock in east Germany is in poor conditions by westem standards, it is
nevertheless  a valuable  asset. Despite  its poor conditions,  the housing  stock (without  land) may
be worth DM 200 billion, and schools, hospitals  and office  buildings  fulfill  their basic functions,
and can be upgraded  with modest  rehabilitation  and equipment  investments. The same applies
to a good part of infrastructure. Insufficient,  yes, but far better than none at all.  The obsolete-40-
telephone  system is a case in point: after only nine months and an investment  of DM 7 billion,
mostly for a digital overlay system, long-distance  capacity has increased ten-fold, and endless
busy signals  vanished. In the transport sector, the predominantly  north-south  railway traffic has
been replaced by  east-west road transport, adapting rapidly to  the totally different post-
unification transport requirements.  Some roads are heavily congested, but rehabilitation  and
upgrading  of existing facilities  will give several years  of breathing  space, until new road and rail
projects will come to  fruition.  The m ,re limited private motorization makes more of the
transport capacity available  for productive  uses, and trucks are fortunately  mobile.
In  terms of  investment, creating high productivity  jobs  is  primarily a  question of
replacing and upgrading much of the machinery  and equipment in the manufacturing  sector,
selective  upgrading  of infrastructure,  and adding  (rather  inexpensive)  productivity  tools for office
workers:  computers,  telephones,  fax machines,  automated  check-out  and inventory  controls, cash
dispensers, and so on.  Most of the latter are closely related to the telephone system, and
Telekom's DM 55 billion investment  program in east Germany will create in a few years the
most modern telephone  system in Europe.  Investments  of DM 50 billion are planned for the
railways and another DM 60 billion for highways.  As approval procedures are  to be cut
drastically  by legislating  major projects  in all their details, with recourse limited  to constitutional
issues, construction  can begin soon, but completion  of major new projects will take at least until
1995.  Nevertheless, short-term improvements are  possible through removing  selected
bottlenecks,  and incremental  improvements  (e.g., computerized  signalling).
In the industrial  sector, only one-half of the existing  jobs are likely to be saved  through
privatization transactions, the rest will be lost to  restructuring measures.  The investment
commitments  by acquirers in privatization transactions  (Table 7) provide probably the most
reliable guide to investment  requirements  in the industrial sector. Excluding  the energy sector,
investment  commitments  average about DM 70,000 per job saved, about the same as the net
(depreciated)  capital stock  per employee  in west German  industry. Similarly,  a survey of firms
with investment  projects in east Germany  indicated  that these firms intended  to invest about DM- 41 -
70 billion by the mid-1990s,  creating some 400.000 jobs.  Excluding  utilities, investment  costs
per job were given at about DM 100,000 per job 36 by surveyed firms.  Two-thirds of these
firms were in the manufacturing  sector, a quarter in services, and the remainder in commerce
and construction.  The investment  plans of these new ventures are about equivalent to those
agreed so far unJer privatization  transactions (Table 7) althwigh there may be some overlap
between the two categories, notably in energy and automobiles.
The salvageable  1.5 million industrial  jobs may thus require modernization  investments
of DM 100  billion, while  creating  another one million  industrial  jobs would  require another DM
100 billion, for  a  total  of  DM  200  billion.  Infrastructure investments programs under
preparation add up  to another DM 250 billion. 37 These are  large, but not unmanageable
amounts, if compared to the fiscal transfer of DM  100 billion per year for 1991 and 1992.
While investments  in the manufacturing  sector are estimated at only DM 16 billion in 1991,
large increases can be expected for 1992, as projects move beyond the planning stage.  If
investment  continues  to increase  at 30% per year for the next three years, before levelling  off,
(an optimistic but not unfeasible  assumption), total investments  in 1991-95  would total around
DM 580 billion, including all of the above, and leaving another DM 25 billion per year for
investments in  housing, and private and public services.  Most likely, the  infrastructure
investment  programs will take longer than five years to implement,  leaving a larger share for
housing and service sector investments. The macro-consequences  would be an unusually  high
share of investment in GDP, in the 35-40% range, and investment  in east Germany would be
one-fifth  of the German total.
Creating  a productive  capital  stock, functionally  equivalent  to that of west Germany,  over
a period of five years is thus economically  feasible.  East Germany would still look much
poorer, particularly  as housing and urban amenities  are concerned, but equipment  at the place
16  This is about midway between the net (depreciated) value of manufacturing capital per employee in west Gernany  (DM 70,000) at
replacement costs and the gross (undepreciated) value (DM 140,000).
"  Including: Electric power DM 50 billion, gas 20,  railways S0, roads 60, urban transpoit  12, telephone 55.- 42 -
of work is not the problem.  The question is, rather, whether the work force will be able to
adapt so rapidly to changing demand patterns and job requirements.  This could come about
either by lowering social protection, to enhance labor market mobility, or by a larger role for
government-directed  training and employment  programs.  Given the political constraints, the
latter appears more likely, and has already started in  1991 through creation of rather large
training and employment  programs, administered  by the national employment  agency.
E.  Assessment and Conclusions
The experience with the German unification to date raises the question whether there
would have been alternative, and better, courses of action.  Such options can be considered  in
three broad areas: (a) the initial conversion  rate and, closely  connected, wage policies; (b) the
wisdom of transferring the economic and legal system of the FRG in its entirety; and (c) the
desirability  of the adopted mix of adjustment  measures,  in particular the trade-off  between social
assistance, public investment  spending, and incentives  for private investment.
Exchange Rate and Wage Policy. If large-scale  financial  assistance  from west Germany
were not available, the currency conversion would  have been a severe mistake. But such help
is available, and unrestricted  migration  is a political  reality. Using a lower exchange  rate (such
as 2:1), without further adjustment  in wages, would have implied  a gross salary difference  of
6: 1, and a net (after tax) difference  of 4:1.  With such  differentials,  strong  migration  would  have
been likely, depriving eastern Germany  of its most productive  and entrepreneurial  people, and
creating a large housing shortage in the west.  This does not make economic  sense, quite apart
from the personal and social dislocation  of such large-scale  migration. Since investment  costs
for such a large number of new jobs would have been roughly the same in east and west, the
migration  option imposes additional  costs, as housing  would have to be built in west Germany.
It should  be noted again that the 1:1 currency conversion  was not the determining  factor for the
present  high wages. Rather it is the 1991 collective  bargaining  agreements  which  are setting  the
pace.- 43 -
It is unlikely that a more gradual unification process would have been an advantage:
lower wages would have been desirable only if migration  could have been held in check.  But
the decay of the GDR state and institutions  was already so advanced  before the economic  union
that wage restraint would have been difficult, if not impossible,  to implement. If migration  is
not an option (as is the case elsewhere) the argument is exactly the opposite, and the same
applies to the wage increases granted on top of the conversion arrangements. In the case of
Germany, these large increases have to be seen as part of the costs of moving to a free market
overnight. The only alternative would  be government  imposed wage restraint.  This would go
against the very foundations  of the German social market  economy.
Big Bang versus Gradual Change.  Unification  has meant  importing  the entire  economic
and legal system of the Federal Republic. In many respects, this rather complex system has
proved less than optimal for solving the problems  of a sudden transition from a command  to a
market  economy. Some temporary  exemptions  and transitional  measures  have been introduced
right from the  start, others were added later, as  some provisions proved unworkable, in
particular the preference given to reprivatization  (restitution)  which has been softened  in 1991,
by giving the privatization  agency considerable  powers to sell enterprises to external investors,
even if restitution  claims were pending.  Similar adverse  experiences  have been made with the
complex and lengthy planning procedures for major public investment projects, such as new
highways, rail links, or airports.  Legal action is in preparation to shorten the lead times for
such projects drastically. These excessively  complicated  regulatory  procedures are one aspect
of what has become known as  "eurosclerosis."  Many of these special procedures for east
Germany  deserve close consideration  for introduction  on both sides of the former iron curtain.
Beyond  the unfinished  agenda of deregulation,  however, the use of transitional  regimes should
probably be minimized. Yes, there are very considerable  learning  costs involved  in the adoption
of an entire legal system, but any transitional  regime would create too much uncertainty, and
learning cost on both sides.
Adjustment Measures.  The question  then remains whether  the special incentives  have
been sufficient and whether the right measures have been introduced.  To some extent the-.44 -
answer has already been given: some  measures, in particular trade measures,  protecting  the east
German  market, have proved unworkable  and were dropped  after a few weeks. Other transition
measures  proved insufficient,  or had to be extended. Indeed, it is quite possible that some of
the transitional  measures  will again be prolonged  beyond  their present terminal  date. Apart from
public investment programs in infrastructure, most of these measures  are either labor market
adjustment  measures  or incentives  to attract  private investment. Some  economists  (e.g., Akerlof
et al.,  1991) have argued that general employment  subsidies  would have been superior.  That
conclusion, however, rests entirely on  highly stylized assumptions that are convenient for
economic  modelling, but very far from reality. 38 Most importantly,  labor is not homogeneous
during this wrenching  transition. Labor subsidies  would  be spread indiscriminately  over sectors
and firms with and without adjustment  problems.  The much-criticized  partial unemployment
benefits provide much more targeted help to firms with severe adjustment problems and still
unclear business prospects.  The easier eligibility  rules have now been extended to the end of
1991,  giving firms some  time to decide  on their business  strategies  and manpower  requirements.
Labor subsidies, by contrast,  would simply  perpetuate  past inefficient  structures. In view of the
large needs to improve infrastructure  and urban amenities, employment  programs are a useful
alternative  to unemployment  payments.
Investment subsidies  have also been criticized on the grounds that they would tend to
distort allocation  decisions,  leading to uneconomically  capital-intensive  investments. While this
may be true in theory, it is doubtful in practice. Investment  costs per job are not particularly
high in  manufacturing, except in a  few process industries in  chemicals and basic metals.
General investment subsidies that have been granted are fairly low (12%), and the additional
special subsidies  under regional  assistance  programs are given only for selected purposes, and
eligibility  criteria (and expenditure  ceilings)  exclude  uneconomically  capital-in ensive activities.
"  See Burda  and  Wyplosz  (1991)  for some  of the  theoretical  points,  and  Schatz  and  Schmidt  (1991)  and  Deutsche  Bank  (1991)  for some
of the  empirical  shortcomings  of these  conclusions.- 45 -
The question then remains whether  a sufficient  share of direct government  expenditures
and private sector incentives  have  been geared to productive, rather than social, purposes. For
the first year of the union, the answer  is probably negative, but mostly  due to the administrative
friction in getting investments  going. More could have been done early on to get transport and
other public infrastructure improvements  going, and this would have improved employment
earlier on.  While this may have been a valid point during the first six months of the union, it
has now been overtaken by events.  Perhaps t'ae best that can be done at present is to sit back
and watch the implementation  of the "Big Bang" under the present policy framework.- 46 -
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